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 The end of ‘the West’ and the future of global 
constitutionalism 
 m a t t i a s   k u m m  ,   j o n a t h a n   h a v e r c r o f t  , 
 j e f f r e y   d u n o f f  a n d   a n t j e   w i e n e r  
 I.  The collapse of ‘the West’? 
 A century after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and more than 25 years 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘Eastern Block’, we may now 
to be witnessing the collapse of the American Republic and the Western 
order it created and led after WWII. Whether NATO, the EU and the 
string of alliances the United States has built across Asia will continue to 
exist in three or fi ve years is by no means a foregone conclusion, but it has 
become an open question.  1  2016 was the year that Americans elected 
the populist authoritarian nationalist Donald J Trump as the forty-fi fth 
President of the United States and the British voted in favour of ‘Brexit’. 
The US/British alliance that underwrote the global order after WWII may 
well remain an alliance: the fi rst foreign leader the new President received 
was Theresa May, although only after meeting with Nigel Farage, the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) leader. However, both they 
and their erstwhile partners in that alliance are now playing a leading role 
in the unravelling of the order that they built and supported. Thus, Trump 
has dismissed the United Nations (UN) as a ‘social club’ and threatened to 
cut down US contributions, originally characterised NATO as obsolete, 
and stated that he would be neither surprised nor concerned if the European 
Union (EU) disintegrated. Furthermore he threatens to upend the global 
trade order, burying the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership Agreement (TPPA) and 
ending negotiations surrounding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), threatening the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), at least in his pronouncements, showing no indication to take 
seriously World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. Meanwhile under 
 1  See A-M Slaughter, ‘The Return of Anarchy?’ (2017) 70  Columbia Journal of International 
Affairs 11–16. 
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the leadership of Prime Minister Theresa May the UK is headed for a ‘hard 
Brexit’, seeking to cut all formal association with the EU. What is clear 
is that in the event of an election victory of the National Front’s Marine Le 
Pen in France in May – a genuine possibility at the time of writing – the 
survival chances of the EU in its present form would be slim and the post-
WWII narrative of a relatively cohesive liberal community of ‘the West’ 
would have lost all plausibility. Of course, none of us have a crystal ball 
and even those equipped with the toolbox of scientifi c polling, we have 
learnt, are unable to reliably predict political outcomes. It may, therefore, 
all turn out very differently: in European elections moderate candidates 
may well keep the upper hand, as was the case in the recent Dutch elections, 
and a bumbling and incompetent Trump Presidency might come to a 
quick inglorious end leaving a more conventional hard right Republican 
establishment in charge, or, even less likely, Trump may be pushed or 
persuaded to pursue more moderate and internationally engaging positions. 
But with far right populist authoritarian parties and leaders enjoying 
considerable successes across Europe and the US even such a less dramatic 
scenario should not detract from the decay of ‘the West’ as a relatively 
cohesive geopolitical confi guration anchoring a normative model of global 
order in which commitments to human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law are central. 
 Given this state of affairs, what are the implications for the future 
of Global Constitutionalism? The world and the discipline faces new 
challenges and the unravelling of ‘the West’ may well lead to all kinds 
of disruptions of the existing order and undermine any residual plausibility 
that apologetic status quo embracing liberal progress narratives might have. 
But Global Constitutionalism as a practice and as a cognitive frame for 
scholarly inquiry is unlikely to lose its analytical, critical and constructive 
bite. The end of ‘the West’, if it were to occur, would not imply the end 
of Global Constitutionalism. 
 II.  Why a demise of ‘the West’ will not lead to a demise of 
constitutionalism 
 When the Soviet Union collapsed, it not only brought along with it 
the collapse of the order it had created and dominated after WWII (the 
Warsaw Pact, COMECON, and a global empire of client states), it also 
spelled out the end of Communism as a relevant global ideology. Even 
in the event of a collapse of the West, there will be no equivalent demise 
of Western ideology, if that ideology is understood as a commitment to 
constitutionalism: to pluralist, open liberal constitutional democracies 
domestically and a global order in which claims relating to human rights, 
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democracy and the rule of law are asserted, negotiated and contested 
across different institutional fora and contexts. On the contrary, what 
will become clearer than ever before is that the relationship between ‘the 
West’ and constitutionalism has always been a complicated one and that 
the category of ‘the West’ is a Cold War and post-colonial category that 
today is used primarily by anti-constitutionalist national elites to discredit 
the emancipatory ambitions of those who they aspire to rule. In that sense 
the ‘the death of the West’ may lead to an emancipation from the idea 
that the idea of constitutionalism should paradigmatically be identifi ed 
with the practices of the US and the EU. 
 The demise of constitutionalism and the institutions it has created after 
WWII is unlikely for three reasons. First, constitutionalist ideals have 
long taken hold outside of the West. Whether the American constitutional 
order will survive Trump may be an open question, even if many believe 
that it will. The fate of constitutionalism in Poland or Hungary hangs in 
the balance. Furthermore recent empirical studies have found evidence 
for more general widespread authoritarian backsliding of states that 
had embraced democracy after 1989. But that tendency is by no means 
universal. Other constitutional democracies outside of ‘the West’ may 
well be going through affi rmative constitutional moments. To take just 
three examples: It is diffi cult not to read South Korean popular dismay 
of their corrupt and inept President and the impeachment proceedings 
before the Constitutional Court as a genuine constitutional moment, 
a symptom of deepening of constitutionalist sensibilities in South Korea. 
In Myanmar, following the free and fair elections in late 2015 there has 
been a fi rst peaceful transition of power from a military to a civil 
government. In Colombia the ultimately successful deal between the 
Colombian government and FARC means not only that the constitutional 
order in Colombia has been stabilised, but that at the time of writing 
the last armed confl ict in South America has been settled peacefully. 
Perhaps the darkest pessimism is the result of a Western bias. A more 
complex picture emerges, when taking a genuinely global perspective. 
 Second, the principled grammar of Global Constitutionalism is hard 
wired into a dense network of treaties, institutions and practices globally 
and enjoys the general support of a wide range of stake-holders. If the United 
States and the West more generally are reluctant to take a leadership role in 
the progressive evolution of international law, a coalition of other actors 
may step in. The current negotiations under way in the UN concerning a 
Nuclear-Weapon Ban Treaty are taking place without any of the major 
Western powers. It is an open question how effective the current Western 
boycott will be and whether it can prevent the majority of the international 
community from establishing a legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, further 
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stigmatizing these weapons and building momentum towards effective 
nuclear disarmament. But whatever the case may be, the efforts currently 
underway show a degree of confi dence of non-Western actors as stakeholders 
and norm-entrepreneurs within the international system – with Brazil, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria and South Africa playing a leading 
role – that until recently would have seemed unimaginable. Furthermore the 
inertia and resilience of these structures is likely to be considerable, both 
because they are diffi cult to change without consensus and because they may 
well become the focal point of resistance or new strategic positioning. If the 
US gives up on the institutional infrastructure of global trade, for example, 
this creates an opportunity for China to position itself as a reliable anchor, 
partner and leader, as Xi Jinping has tried to do at Davos this year. If 
populist nationalist authoritarians like Trump seek to undermine open 
borders and global trade, perhaps that will make it easier to forge coalitions 
among centre-right and centre-left political actors elsewhere to support 
deeper trade relations. The election of Trump has, for example, improved 
the chances for CETA to be ratifi ed by European Member States as a clear 
statement against nationalist retrenchment. Of course, it will have signifi cant 
implications that major powers are increasingly led by authoritarian 
nationalist strongmen – not just in the Transatlantic World, but also in 
China, Russia and Turkey. There will inevitably be some decay and loss of 
relevance of international laws, institutions and practices, when powerful 
actors imagine international relations as zero-sum interactions between 
powerful leaders, struggling to defi ne and expand their respective spheres of 
infl uence. But the story is unlikely to be the demise of Global Constitutionalism, 
rather than a signifi cantly more complex story in which elements of demise 
and decay are complemented by resistance, reconfi guration and innovation. 
 Third, there is no richly-conceptualised alternative ideology with 
potential global appeal contesting the global constitutionalist grammar. 
The alternatives that exist take the form of a motley confi guration of 
ideologies and power structures that are unlikely to form the basis of 
stable new coalitions or signifi cantly expand their appeal, as the following 
brief analysis of anti-constitutionalist ideologies and the power structures 
that embrace them seeks to make clear. 
 III.  Constitutionalism and the divided rest: Three kinds of 
anti-constitutionalist ideologies and powers 
 It may be helpful to distinguish between three kinds of powers/ideologies. 
First, there is Islamic Fundamentalism that, in its various forms, is the 
cause of a terrible internecine civil war within the Islamic world. Here 
Saudi Arabia and its brand of Wahhabism, Iran and its Shiite Ayatollahs 
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and various terrorist organisations spread across borders, most obviously 
ISIS, are central factors. There is no global war between Islam and the 
West. In a global context Islamic terrorism in Western states appears as a 
peripheral phenomenon. All of these Islamic groups may imagine themselves 
as also fi ghting ‘the West’ or cast the US as the ‘Great Satan’, but they are 
primarily fi ghting each other as well as constitutionalist tendencies they 
connect to the West within the dominantly Muslim world they are part of. 
In that respect the Nigerian Boko Haram (meaning literally: Western 
education is prohibited) is no different from the others. ‘The West’ in these 
ideological struggles is not a geographical category, but refers to powerful 
tendencies within Muslim majority societies, feeling drawn to the promises 
of dignity, peace, justice and prosperity they associate with commitments 
drawn from the liberal constitutionalist world. Referring to these as ‘Western’ 
is a rhetorical move the purpose of which is to classify these tendencies as 
culturally alien and inauthentic, rather than as legitimate demands of mostly 
Muslim fellow citizens claiming their rights. 
 Second, there are populist nationalist authoritarian movements, parties 
and leaders that seek to subvert and replace liberal constitutional 
democracy. In that respect Trump in the US, Hungary´s Orbán, Poland’s 
Kaczy ń ski, Russia’s Putin, and Turkey’s Erdo ğ an are ideological partners 
in crime. Together they present a distinctive counterposition to pluralist 
constitutional democracy domestically that has been described as ‘illiberal 
democracy’, ‘guided democracy’ or ‘sovereign democracy’. In their world 
a free press is all too easily the enemy of the people and needs to be 
controlled, judges and academics need to be brought in line, and inauthentic 
elites need to be prevented from following through on their basically 
treasonous globalist ideologies. Instead of checks and balances provided 
by intermediary institutions the people are one united by the great leader, 
who may occasionally seek confi rmation in direct referenda. In this context 
constitutional forms are secondary, their substance is subverted and 
democracy is celebrated as the will of the real authentic people, constituted 
by those who support the strong man. 
 A third group of states, combine authoritarianism and nationalism 
with ideas of merit-based technocratic government and a greater openness 
to the world. Here there are not only no constitutional courts, no free 
press and signifi cant restrictions on academic freedom. There are also no 
referenda, as the ideal citizen is equated with a docile subject appreciating 
the performance of welfare enhancing elites. But there is a defence of global 
trade and global engagement more generally. In China the Communist 
Party is increasingly justifying its role with reference to its meritocratic 
features and economic successes, as does the People’s Action Party in 
Singapore that has always ensured for itself a qualifi ed majority since 
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Singapore achieved independence. Similarly states like the United Arab 
Emirates with cities such as Dubai or Abu Dhabi, or Qatar legitimate 
themselves by reference to their ambitious architectural or cultural projects 
and general economic and civilizational appeal as global hubs for commerce, 
transportation or trade. Who needs constitutionalism, if signifi cant successes 
are possible without it and might even be easier achievable without it? 
 There may be a thin overlapping consensus committed to protectionism 
and a transactional power-based conception of foreign relations that a 
critical group of the more prominent anti-constitutionalists share. If that 
thin consensus became more widespread or should some other potentially 
stable hegemonic coalition of these actors emerge, the risks to Global 
Constitutionalism would be serious. But there is currently little prospect of 
a stable coalition between these groups of states – religious fundamentalist, 
nationalist or technocratic – or even groups of states within each category. 
At the present time, they are united only in their rejection of ‘the West’. 
 IV.  On the relationship between ‘the West’ and ‘constitutionalism’ 
 But it would be a mistake to describe the core plot as ‘the constitutionalist 
West against the (divided) rest’. What the current crisis in the US and 
Europe makes clearer than it has ever been in the post-WWII era is that 
it was always little more than a convenient simplifi cation – either with 
an apologetic or a critical purpose – to connect a geographical term 
‘the West’ with the liberal ideas of the constitutionalist tradition. 
 The idea of the ‘the West’ was always an ambivalent one. On the one 
hand it referred to a legal-political ideal: constitutionalist ideas connected 
to the French and American Revolutions in the eighteenth century. This 
was the idea of persons as free and equals governing themselves individually, 
as part of a national community and an international community of states. 
Since the end of the Cold War in Europe and North America there has 
been a broad consensus amongst mainstream political parties of both the 
left and the right that their policy disagreements take place within a shared 
commitment to some version of a liberal constitutional democracy and 
a rule-bound international legal order, with its own set of institutions 
and practices, helping to provide global public goods, organising a global 
economy and furthering human rights. On the other hand ‘the West’ 
referred to an alliance and a power confi guration. At the core of that 
power confi guration after WWII was the US, NATO and Western Europe 
and later the extended European Union, along with economic institutional 
infrastructure – the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank – they dominated. 
The normative ideal and the power confi guration were, in the self-
description of those who imagined themselves ‘the West’, supposed to 
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hang together. The power confi guration and alliance was claimed to be 
grounded in a commitment of principle and endowed with the purpose 
to defend and empower others to realise these principles. The global 
constitutional moment after WWII, which saw the establishment of the UN, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the war crimes tribunals in 
Tokyo and Nuremberg as well as the American-initiated constitutional 
projects in Japan and Germany, seemed to support the identity between ‘the 
West’ and the idea of global constitutionalist project, as did the enlargement 
and deepening of the European Union after end of the Cold War. 
 But, of course, the relationship between the normative idea and the 
concrete exercises of power by the US-guided alliance was always more 
complicated. In the geostrategic competition with the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War, NATO included among its members the authoritarian regimes 
in Portugal, Greece and Turkey. In its policies in the Middle East and in 
South America the US favoured not the regime more closely aligned with 
constitutionalist principles, but the regime more aligned to its interests and 
more opposed to the interests of the Soviet Union. Geostrategic considerations 
more often than not trumped considerations of principle. With the Soviet 
Union disintegrated, US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War 
continued to refl ect the tensions between the realist pursuit of national 
interests narrowly (mis)conceived and commitments of principle, perhaps 
most visible in its aggressive and yet utterly unproductive use of force in the 
‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere, much of it in 
violation of international law, or its roguish attempts to undermine the 
International Criminal Court during the fi rst term of the Bush administration. 
 Note how this ambivalence allows both actors within the West as well 
as non-Western powerful groups to immunise themselves from criticism, 
when their actions are challenged in the name of human rights, democracy 
or the rule of law. 
 For politically responsible ‘Western’ elites being the West and effectively 
claiming original ownership of these ideals means that anything that is 
being done is done also in the name of these ideals and is thus presumptively 
compatible with them. Criticism of Western actions is presumptively the 
result of a lack of commitment or a lack of understanding of the West’s 
principles. If we are the West and we are all about the right kind of values, 
then nothing we do can be fundamentally wrong. 
 On the other hand authoritarian regimes elsewhere found it easy to 
denounce ‘the West’ as hypocritical and unprincipled. Was the universalism 
it espoused not just a particularism with imperial ambitions, as it had been, 
when European powers colonised the world in the name of Christianity or 
civilisation? The ideal appeared tainted by the ambivalence and hypocrisy of 
those who were identifi ed with it and served as its leading advocates. This is 
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convenient for powerful dominant groups in non-Western societies seeking 
to immunise themselves from criticism in the name of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. Instead of taking seriously that criticism and 
justifying their behaviour, criticism is conveniently defl ected by engaging in 
tirades against the hypocritical imperial ‘West’. 
 What the present crisis in the US and the EU makes clear, is that even in 
‘the West’ the commitment to constitutionalism is tenuous and increasingly 
contested. What makes Trump distinctive are not his xenophobic, racist, 
protectionist or nationalist policy proposals. What makes him distinctive is 
that he clearly does not imagine himself as an offi ce holder in a constitutional 
republic and therefore subject to and constrained by constitutional processes 
and limitations. He has spoken of ‘the reign’ of Trump and identifi es the 
people with those who support him (‘What is important now is to unite 
the people. All the other people don’t matter.’). Those who oppose him 
must be either corrupt or incompetent. There is no space here for legitimate 
opposition, the separation of powers and the contestatory pluralism 
characteristic of liberal constitutional democracies.  2  
 Of course, it was always a radical simplifi cation to identify ‘the West’ 
with a commitment to constitutionalist principles. Yes, the French and the 
American Revolutions which brought about a re-imagination of law and 
politics within a constitutionalist paradigm took place in ‘the West’. But 
the revolutionary ideals did not gain uncontroversial acceptance in much 
of Europe until very late in the twentieth century. By 1815 with the defeat 
of Napoleon the revolution and its ideals appeared to have been defeated 
as reactionary powers established their own order in the Congress of Vienna. 
As the nineteenth century wore on, various kinds of nationalism supplanted, 
sometimes allied with, but sometimes opposed ‘the ideas of 1789’. The 
deep divide in France between those who may be inclined to vote for 
Marine Le Pen and her Front National and dismantle the EU and those 
who oppose her refl ects a dividing line that has its historical antecedent in 
the battle lines between the liberal supporters and the opponents of the 
French Third Republic in the late nineteenth century. The confl ict between 
an authoritarian cultural identity based nationalism and constitutionalist 
ideals was also dramatically highlighted by a widely circulated and 
discussed pamphlet signed by intellectuals celebrating the outbreak of 
WWI in Germany favourably contrasting the nationalist culturalist ideals of 
1914 to those of 1789. Contemporary political movements and authoritarian 
strongmen on the far right in the US and Europe repeat in a remarkably 
unoriginal way the core tropes of nationalism, sovereignty and identity 
 2  For a penetrating analysis see  J-W  Müller ,  What is Populism? ( University of Pennsylvania 
Press ,  Philadelphia, PA ,  2016 ). 
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that were invoked against liberal constitutionalist ideals of the pre-WWI 
European world. 
 The lesson to be drawn from this is simple: We should give up the idea of a 
deep connection between constitutionalist ideas and geographical regions, 
countries or power constellations. Perhaps there is no region in the world 
where the demands of constitutionalism have not at some point fostered 
resistance and alienation among some who invoke national culture, identity, 
and sovereignty. Is there anything structurally different from Chinese debates 
about Confucianism and Asian values, when compared to Russian debates 
between Pan-Slavists and Westerners, or French nineteenth century debates 
between those defending the Catholic-authoritarian ‘moral order’ against 
liberal and republican ideas, or the debates among German intellectuals in the 
early twentieth century between the ‘ideas of 1914’ and the ‘ideas of 1789’? 
Or, for that matter, Trump’s advisor Bannon fi ghting ‘the liberal establishment’ 
allying with the far right’s factions within the Vatican and fi nding inspiration 
in the fascist Catholic philosopher Julius Evola? The structure of reactionary 
challenges appear remarkably stable across time and space. 
 On the other hand there are also very few areas in the world where 
constitutionalist ideals have not inspired men and women to claim their 
rights and build political movements towards the establishment of legal 
and political orders or contesting existing laws and practices in the name 
of constitutionalist principles in order to reform them. From the beginning 
the appeal of the revolutionary ideals transcended ‘the West’, also triggering, 
for example, the Haitian Revolution – an anti-slavery, anti-colonial 
insurrection. The commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law is not a commitment to abolish or fl atten national cultures, but to 
change national culture and identity to make it more refl exive and inclusive, 
opening it up to the wider world, creating more opportunity and a wider 
cognitive horizon, recognising difference, embracing pluralism and allowing 
for the contestation of structures of domination, whatever form they 
may take. Similarly, Global Constitutionalism is not about abolishing 
sovereign states, but about integrating them globally and building the 
appropriate legal and institutional infrastructure to empower them to 
better fulfi l their function to respect, protect and fulfi l the rights of those 
under their jurisdiction. It thus appears that historically both the appeal 
and the resistance to constitutionalism is a global phenomenon. 
 V.  The future of global constitutionalism: Lessons from the history of 
Berlin 
 From the beginning of the year, the management of the Journal has moved 
to Berlin, Germany. There is something deeply appropriate about a Journal 
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of this name and focus to be based in Berlin. In our 2015 editorial we 
insisted that the history of Global Constitutionalism does not lend itself to 
simple progress narratives, emphasised historical contingency and insisted 
that the fate of Global Constitutionalism was an open question. The 
present tendencies of unravelling of the global order raise very serious 
questions indeed. There is probably no better place to become aware of 
the frailties and complexities of constitutional progress without giving 
up hope than Berlin. 
 Berlin was the relatively liberal Prussian rule-of-law oriented place, 
where Voltaire sought refuge as a guest of Frederick the Great. It is also 
the place where the idea of a liberal constitutional democracy in a unifi ed 
Germany was buried after the failed constitutional revolution of 1848. 
When German unity was fi nally achieved in 1871 and Berlin became 
the capital of the new German nation-state, this was brought about by 
conservative, industrialist and nationalist political forces that had little 
connection to the constitutionalist tradition. When the deeply reactionary 
but subtle and gifted diplomat Bismarck stepped down in 1890 and a 
proud and ambitious young Emperor sought to demand a place in the sun 
for the new great power that Germany was becoming, it took another 
24 years before the fi rst great twentieth century dance of death began in 
Europe. Yet it was during this time – between 1890 and 1914 – that the 
basic structure of the modern city of Berlin was established, including the 
many ‘Altbau’ apartments that are so popular for the bourgeois bohemians 
who like to populate the city today. After the disaster of WWI, Berlin 
became the centre of avant-garde art, theatre, cinema and literature in the 
Weimar Republic – the vibrant capital of a frail liberal constitutional 
democracy, whose mainstream parties would be derided as ‘system-parties’ 
by the radical right and the radical left and no longer command a majority 
by the early 1930s. Even though the Nazis never won electoral majorities 
in Berlin, the city became the heart of darkness for 12 years, the centre 
of an evil empire that organised a global dance of death and genocidal 
annihilation on an industrial scale. After that nightmare which also led to 
the destruction of signifi cant parts of the city, Berlin started a new troubled life 
as ground zero in the Cold War – the nation divided between East and West, 
with a wall eventually running right through the city. Today Berlin is a place 
that provides a distinctively German interpretation of what it means to be 
a cosmopolitan European. The past is very much present in a sophisticated 
culture of commemoration, from the remarkable Memorial of the Murdered 
Jews in Europe beside the Brandenburg Gate – a self-infl icted huge scar on the 
face of the city – to the conserved bullet-hole-riddled buildings in Mitte, to 
‘Stolpersteine’ – gold-plated stones with the names of the deported etched 
into them and placed in the pavement in front of the building they were 
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deported from. Yet notwithstanding the omnipresence of the past, it does 
not hold hostage the vibrant present or denies the possibility of a better 
future. Berlin is a perennially bankrupt city (‘poor but sexy’, as a previous 
mayor insisted) that refused to shut down one of its three heavily subsidised 
world class operas. It is one of the few growing cities in Germany, with the 
highest Jewish growth rate in the world, and while it lacks the class and 
style associated with Paris or the presence of a globalised bourgeoisie like 
in London, New York, Singapore or Hong Kong, it provides Germans, 
Europeans and other citizens of the world with an unrivalled context 
for refl ections on depravity, tragedy, redemption and the possibility of 
progress. 
 The history of Berlin reminds us that a commitment to human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law can never be taken for granted and that 
political entrepreneurs are prone to exploit, with devastating consequences, 
publics who lose faith in them because they cannot see how their lives are 
protected and improved by these practices. The principles upon which 
GlobCon was founded need nurturing, by critically exposing false friends 
justifying complacency or oppression in their name, by constructively 
marshalling them to improve institutions and laws and to vigorously defend 
them against those who oppose them. 
 Since the last editorial was written, the Journal has seen some other 
changes. The institutional home of the Journal for its fi rst fi ve years was 
the Chair of Political Science especially Global Governance in collaboration 
with the Center for Globalisation and Governance (CGG) at the University 
of Hamburg, run by Antje Wiener with Sassan Gholiagha as the Managing 
Editor. While Antje remains fully on board as editor, Sassan has left us 
to move on to other things. Furthermore Tony Lang has left us as an 
editor, after having assumed substantial new administrative responsibilities 
as Head of the School of International Relations at the University of 
St. Andrews. Finally Jim Tully, who has served in a central consulting role 
since well before the fi rst GlobCon issue was published will be retiring 
from active service. We thank them all for their tireless engagement and 
commitment to the Journal. On the other hand we are happy to welcome 
Jonathan Havercroft to the editorial team and Yoon Jin Shin as the new 
Managing Editor of the Journal, running the Journal from the Center for 
Global Constitutionalism headed by Mattias Kumm at the WZB Berlin 
Social Science Center. 
